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ARTICLES
ERISA MISREPRESENTATION AND
NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS:
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE GUISE
OF ERISA?
Clovis Trevino Bravo*

INTRODUCTION

As a result of recent corporate scandals and dramatic market
downturns, many employees whose company-sponsored retirement
saving plans were heavily invested in the stock of their employers have
seen their account balances substantially depleted.1 To recover for their
losses, plan participants have filed lawsuits under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 19742 ("ERISA") alleging that plan
fiduciaries made misrepresentations or failed to disclose information
about the suitability of investing in the company stock.
These
controversial suits are generally derivative or companion cases to
securities fraud class actions arising out of the same alleged
* Macleod Dixon LLP, Associate. Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2008; University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill, B.A. 2005. 1 am thankful to Professor Donald Langevoort for his
valuable guidance from the conception through the completion of this Article. I am also thankful to
Professor Mark Poerio for his helpful comments, and Jennifer Locke Davitt for excellent research
help.
1. See Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossingand Beyond: Implicationsfor Workers, 76
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 815, 824-27 (2002).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2000).
3. This Article does not address the issue of whether ERISA fiduciaries are liable for
imprudence in allowing continued investment in employer stock. See generally Craig C. Martin,
Matthew J. Renaud & Omar R. Akbar, What's up on Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 605 (2006) (discussing imprudent investment claims).
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misrepresentations and nondisclosures.4 Even though the securities and
ERISA lawsuits are based on the same underlying facts, the procedural
and substantive rules governing the two actions are substantially
different. 5 The question arises: are these lawsuits securities litigation
under the guise of ERISA? If so, should they be allowed to proceed in
the absence of the procedural safeguards imposed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19956 ("PSLRA")?
Thus far commentators have addressed this overlap only partially or
incidentally; 7 hence the need to address in this Article the procedural,
remedial, and substantive differences between the ERISA and the
securities action side by side. Following this introduction, Part I of this
Article presents a brief overview of ERISA fiduciary duties. Part II
identifies the most significant procedural and remedial differences
between the ERISA lawsuit and the securities class action. Part III
discusses disclosure duties under ERISA and the securities laws, and
Part IV examines whether securities and ERISA misrepresentation and
nondisclosure claims overlap, complement, or are in conflict with each
other. This Article concludes that the substantial overlap and potential
conflict between the two actions warrants substantive clarification and
procedural harmonization to prevent plaintiffs' lawyers from using
ERISA to evade the protections that the federal securities laws provide
against abusive litigation.
4. See id. at 605.
5. Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: An Evolving Standard,38
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 889-90 (2005).
6. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
For a discussion of the procedural requirements of the PSLRA, see Michael A. Perino, Enron's
Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxtey Act of
2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 689-94 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Shelby D. Green, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? That is the Questionfor the
CorporateFiduciary Who is Also a Pension Plan FiduciaryUnder ERISA: Resolving the Conflict of
Duty, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 831, 876 (2007) (arguing that the ERISA fiduciary duty to disclose
could be read to require fiduciaries with insider obligations "to advise the employees that further
investment in the company would not be wise, but without stating why, if that would reveal nonpublic corporate information"); Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should the Securities Exchange Act
be the Sole Federal Remedy for an ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value of Public
Employer Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637 (2006) ("ERISA does not provide an additional
remedy" for misrepresentations or nondisclosures); Martin & Fine, supra note 5, at 912-13 (briefly
discussing some significant procedural differences between ERISA and securities law liability);
Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn't Sell My Company Stock: Is There an ERISA
(or '34 Act) Remedy for Me?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 385, 423-24 (2004) (arguing that recognizing an
ERISA claim for misrepresentations and nondisclosures that would not constitute a securities law
violation "does not do violence on Congress' securities law goals," but questioning whether ERISA
should provide a remedy when such behavior is arguably both a violation of ERISA and of the
securities laws).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss2/10

2

Bravo: ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Liti

2009]

ERISA MISREPRESENTATION AND NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS

499

I. ERISA FIDUCIARY DUTIES

ERISA was enacted to "assure the equitable character" and
financial soundness of retirement and other benefit plans.8 ERISA
imposes the highest standard of conduct known to the law of
fiduciaries. 9 These duties include the duty to act prudently, to follow
directives, to monitor, to diversify, and to act loyally. ERISA fiduciary
duties are not limited by the statute's express provisions: the legislative
history of ERISA suggests that Congress intended to incorporate into
ERISA the core principles of trust law to define the general scope of
fiduciary authority and responsibility.' °
ERISA contemplates two basic types of pension arrangements:
defined benefit and defined contribution plans." When ERISA was
enacted, the predominant pension structure offered by United States
publicly traded companies was the defined benefit plan, which
guarantees a pension benefit determined by using a formula that adjusts
benefits based on variables such as age, length of service, and final
salary.' 2 Now the predominant structure of retirement coverage in the
United States is the defined contribution plan,' 3 which provides benefits
derived from the contributions made by or
on behalf of an employee to
14
employment.
her
or
his
during
an account
The increase in the number of defined contribution plans is almost
wholly attributable to the availability of the 401(k) plan. 15 These plans

8. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)
(2000).
9. See, e.g., Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1453 (6th Cir.
1988) (quoting Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc.,
793 F.2d 1456, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986)).
10. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (citing H.R. REP. No.93-533, at 3-5,
11-13 (1973)); SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, S. Doc. No. 93-406, at

2358-60 (1976); see also Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining
the development of ERISA's core principles of fiduciary conduct from the common law of trusts).
11. ERISA § 3 (34)-(35).
12. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Lagbein, ERSA's Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (1988).
13. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J.
451, 453-54 (2004) (discussing the rise of the defined contribution plan).
14. See generally id. at 455 (discussing the differences of defined contribution plans); Colleen
E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA
Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L. J. 1, 11 (2000) (discussing 401(k) plans).
15. Regina L. Readling, Rethinking "The Plan ": Why ERISA Section 502(a)(2) Should Allow
Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 326
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give participants the opportunity to manage their retirement savings by6
directing contributions among numerous investment alternatives.1
Generally, the sponsoring company's stock is one of many investment
options, however plan participants choose to invest overwhelmingly in
the stock of their employer.' 7 As a result of special tax preferences for
heavy investment in company stock,' 8 many 401(k) plans have
designated the employer stock fund as an Employee Stock Ownership
Plan ("ESOP")-a defined contribution plan designed to be primarily
invested in employer stock.1 9
Even though ERISA does not require employers to offer such plans,
employers who choose to do so must abide by ERISA's strict standards
of fiduciary conduct. 20 First, ERISA stipulates that a fiduciary must
discharge all duties in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan.21 Second, fiduciaries are required to act "solely in
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries," for the "exclusive
purpose" of providing benefits to them. 2 Third, ERISA fiduciaries must
discharge their duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use ....
In addition to the duties of loyalty and prudence, fiduciaries are
bound by the duty of diversification "so as to minimize the risk of large
losses.",24 ERISA's diversification requirement, however, does not apply
to the acquisition or holding of employer stock once a plan or portion of
a plan is designated as a participant-directed eligible individual account
plan ("EIAP"), including ESOPs and 401(k) plans. 25 A conflict arises
(2008) (citing JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 279 (2004)).
16. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES
1 (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401 kemployee.html.
17. See generally Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer

Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 539, 547-52 (2002) (offering several explanations for such
heavy plan investments in employer securities, including context dependence, optimistic bias,
loyalty, and pressure).
18. See Economic Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No.
107-16 § 662(a), 115 Stat. 38, 142 (2001) (amending I.R.C. § 404(k)(2)(a) (2000)) (allowing

employers to deduct dividends paid on ESOP shares when those dividends are, at election of
participants, paid to ESOP and then reinvested in employer stock).
19. 29 U.S.C. § l107(d)(6)(A) (2000).
20. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (2003).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
22. Id. § I104(a)(1)(A)(i).
23. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
24. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
25. Id. § I I07(b)(2)(B). An EIAP is a profit sharing, stock bonus, thrift or savings plan that
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out of heavy employee investment in company stock: ERISA fiduciaries,
who are often corporate insiders, have a duty to operate the plan
exclusively for employees' benefit,26 but may also wear a corporate hat
and "have financial interests that are adverse to the interests of the
beneficiaries but in the best interest of the company. 27
II. ERISA &

SECURITIES LITIGATION

There are several procedural and remedial differences that make it
less burdensome to proceed with an ERISA fiduciary breach claim based
on the same underlying misrepresentations or nondisclosures as a
securities class action. First, some ERISA plaintiffs would not have
standing to sue under the securities laws as a result of the purchase or
sale requirement of Rule 1Ob-5 .28 Second, the set of defendants
intersects only incidentally because only named and functional
fiduciaries may be held responsible under ERISA. Third, ERISA
plaintiffs have to meet a less stringent pleading standard for fault than
the pleading requirements for scienter in securities litigation. Fourth,
ERISA plaintiffs need only plead that their loss could be linked to a
fiduciary wrongdoing, whereas the securities plaintiffs must allege loss
causation. Fifth, an ERISA lawsuit is not subject to the discovery
safeguards of the PSLRA. Finally, plaintiffs in a securities fraud action
generally can only recover actual damages, whereas "[section] 502(a)(2)
[of ERISA] encompasses appropriate claims for 'lost profits.' ' 29 This
section discusses the most significant procedural and remedial
differences that make an ERISA cause of action more likely to survive a
motion to dismiss, and thus more likely to settle at a high value or to get
to the merits than a securities action based on the same allegations of
misrepresentations or nondisclosures.

explicitly provides for acquisition and holding of stock issued by the plan sponsor. Id. § I 107(d)(3).
26. Id. § 1001.
27. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 550 (S.D. Tex.
2003) (citing Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000); Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d
286, 294-95 (2000); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2003)).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
29. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 06-856, slip op. at 5 n.4 (U.S. Feb. 20,
2008).
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A. ProceduralDifferences

1. Bringing an ERISA Lawsuit May Provide a Remedy to Plaintiffs Who
Could Not Otherwise Recover as a Result of the 'Purchase or Sale'
Requirement of Rule 10b-5
Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. 30 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,3 1 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that standing to sue in private actions under Rule
lOb-5 is limited to actual purchasers or sellers of securities.32 Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the language of section
10(b) compelled such a result 33 and that public policy demanded
curtailment of the right of action to avoid "the danger of vexatious
litigation. 34 Thus, a plaintiff claiming not to have sold or not to have
purchased a security lacks standing to sue under Rule 1Ob-5.
On the other hand, ERISA only requires that a participant,
beneficiary, or plan fiduciary commence the civil action.35 Accordingly,
ERISA plaintiffs who claim to have remained invested in company stock
relying on material misrepresentations or nondisclosure would have
standing to sue under ERISA but not under Rule 1Ob-5. However,
securities law may not allow section 10(b) claims where plans transfer
between accounts without a purchase or sale of a security, even if the
participants rely on misrepresentations or nondisclosures in deciding to
invest more heavily in company stock.36 Thus, bringing an ERISA
lawsuit may provide a remedy to those plaintiffs who could not
otherwise recover under the securities laws.

30.
31.
32.

See 17C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Id. at 730-31 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,463 (2d Cir. 1952)).

33. Id. at 735-36 ("the principal express nonderivative private civil remedies, created by
Congress contemporaneously with the passage of [section] 10(b) ... are by their terms expressly
limited to purchasers or sellers of securities").
34. Id. at 740.
35. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. §
I 132(a)(3) (2000).
36. See Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should the Securities Exchange Act Be the Sole
FederalRemedy for an ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentationof the Value of Public Employer Stock?,

39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 657 (2006).
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2. Only Named and Functional Fiduciaries May Be Liable Under ERISA
Any defrauding party may be held liable under Rule lOb-5. 37 The
1934 Act also creates "control person" liability for "[e]very person who,
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable. 3 8 In addition, the
PSLRA gives the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
authority to prosecute individuals who aid and abet violators of the 1934
Act. 39 Whereas any individual who violates Rule 1Ob-5 can be held
liable for fraud, the first issue addressed by a court considering an
ERISA fiduciary breach claim is whether each defendant is a fiduciary
with respect to the plan.40
Whether a particular individual or entity is a fiduciary with respect
to a plan is a highly fact intensive inquiry. 4' Every employee benefits
plan covered by ERISA must have at least one named fiduciary but
others may be deemed functional fiduciaries based on the substantive
authority and particular function exercised vis-a-vis a plan.42 Although
ERISA plaintiffs must plead factual allegations establishing each
defendant's fiduciary status,4 3 courts have adopted a liberal view of who
qualifies as a fiduciary, a concept "to be construed liberally, consistent
with ERISA's policies and objectives. '44 This expansive concept may
apply to the plan administrator, the plan sponsor, or to any director, to
the extent that it exercises or retains any of the functions listed in the
37. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2008). See also Martin & Fine,
supra note 5, at 892.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
39. Id. § 78t(e) (explaining that an aidor or abettor is "any person that knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or
regulation issued under this chapter").
40. Mulder v. PCS Health Sys., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 307, 313 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing In re Unisys
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir.1995); Bunnion v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 403, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
41. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (noting that fiduciary status under
ERISA exists when one is fulfilling certain statutorily defined functions) (citing Siskind v. Sperry
Ret. Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1995)),
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006).
43. See, e.g., Crowley v. Coming, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(dismissing ERISA fiduciary claims against plan sponsor ( through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion) because
complaint "contain[ed] no factual allegations which support a claim that Coming had de facto
control over the Committee members."); In re Providian Fin. Corp. ERISA Litig., No. CO1-05027
CRB, 29 E.B.C. 1567, 1567 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2002) (dismissing complaint because "participants
have lumped their various claims into [an] undifferentiated mass and allege [a] cause of action so
general that it fails to put defendants on notice of allegations against them").
44. In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
(quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 544 (S.D. Tex.
2003)).
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statutory definition of 'fiduciary':
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent: (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of the assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the
45
administration of such plan.

An ERISA fiduciary can also be held liable for a breach committed
by a co-fiduciary if he knowingly participated in, tried to conceal an act
or omission by another fiduciary, or enabled another fiduciary to commit
the breach.46 Although the concept of fiduciary is expansive, a
misrepresentation actionable through the securities laws may not be
actionable under ERISA unless the particular individual or entity making
the statement is a fiduciary with respect to the plan. Thus, the fact that
"[t]he sets of potentially responsible parties" may intersect is only
incidental.47
3. ERISA's Pleading Standard for Fault Is Less Stringent Than the
Pleading Requirement for Scienter in Securities Litigation
The PSLRA, enacted by Congress to curb the "abusive practices
committed in private securities litigation, 4 8 requires plaintiffs to "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with [scienter].,, 49 The Supreme Court has defined
"scienter" as a "cogent and compelling" inference of an intent to deceive
or defraud. 50 Thus, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss "only if
a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
51
facts alleged.",

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
2007).
51.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
Id. § 1105(a).
Rogers v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 521 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008).
H.R. REP.No. 104-369, at31.(1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
15 U.S.C. § 78 u-4(b)(2) (2006).
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., No. 06-484, slip op. at 30 (U.S. June 21,
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss2/10

8

Bravo: ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Liti

2009]

ERISA MISREPRESENTA TION AND NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS

505

Most courts agree that "ERISA does not have heightened pleading
requirements, but is subject to the notice pleading standard of [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 8,''52 or to the heightened pleading standard of
Rule 9(b) if allegations of fiduciary breach involve fraud.
However,
the Supreme Court has recently held in Bell Atlantic Corporation v.
Twombly 54 (an antitrust case), that a plaintiff must allege at the pleading
stage facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level. '5 5 Thus far, several federal courts and circuits have applied
Twombly outside the antitrust context, 56 including to claims of ERISA
fiduciary breach.57 Their application of Twombly, however, has been
uneven because the Court did not specify whether this standard applies
59
to all civil actions 58 or the level of factual detail that it requires.

52. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 652 (S.D. Tex.
2003); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a "short and plain statement" of the relevant elements showing
that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief). See, e.g., In re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d
861, 867 (S.D. Tex. 2004) ("ERISA does not have heightened pleading requirements.").
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."). See, e.g., Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493,
1503 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 9(b) is inapplicable "in cases in which the complaint alleges
breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA, and does not allege fraud or mistake"); Hill v. Bellsouth
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (finding that heightened pleadings were not
required because fraud was not alleged in the breach of fiduciary duties). But see Rankin v. Rots,
278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 866 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("While some of the allegations in support of
[plaintiffs] claim are similar to fraud allegations, i.e. that [defendants] provided false and
misleading information, the gravamen of [plaintiffs] claim is grounded in ERISA. The heightened
pleading requirement under Rule 9(b) will not be imposed where the claim is for a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA.").
54. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
55. Id. at 555.
56. See, e.g., lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that at the very least,
Twombly ought to apply in cases "where massive discovery is likely to create unacceptable
settlement pressures"); Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying
Twombly to a dispute regarding a covenant not to compete); Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 440
n.6 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing Twombly as applied to a cancelled contract).
57. See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly that
"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level..."); see
also Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008) ("a complaint containing a
statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action is
insufficient"); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) ("While a complaint...
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligations to provide the 'grounds' of his
'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions." (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555)); Wilson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 07-60289, 2007 WL 3251684, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 5,
2007).
58. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that whether the new
pleading standard will apply in civil cases is "a question that the future will answer").
59. See Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A "Plausible" Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 827, 830 (2008).
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Nonetheless, even if Twombly raises the level of scrutiny at the pleading
stage, satisfying its "plausibility" standard is significantly less
burdensome than the stringent pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
4. Securities Plaintiffs Must Allege Loss Causation, Whereas ERISA
Plaintiffs Need Only Have Suffered Losses That
Could Be Linked to a Fiduciary Breach
The PSLRA also makes clear that a plaintiff in a Rule 1Ob-5 case
"shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the
defendant . . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover

damages. 6 ° In Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo,6 1 the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff must allege in his complaint loss causation"that the defendant's misrepresentation (or other fraudulent conduct)
proximately caused the plaintiffs economic loss. '' 62 A mere allegation

that a plaintiff "paid artificially inflated prices" as a result of the
misrepresentations is not sufficient to prove loss causation because the
loss occurs only when the stock price falls as a result of the truth being
disclosed.6 3
In contrast, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, ERISA
plaintiffs need only satisfy the more flexible pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)-a pleading must contain "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."64 Thus, ERISA plaintiffs need only show that they suffered
losses that "could be linked" to nondisclosures or misrepresentation by a
fiduciary acting in a fiduciary capacity. 65 Some courts, however, have

dismissed claims that earlier disclosure of nonpublic information would
have prevented or minimized losses because, under the efficient market
hypothesis, had the company publicly released the information earlier,
the market would have adjusted immediately and the plan would
have
66
sustained the same loss it incurred following the announcement.
For instance, the district court in Graden v. Conexant Systems, Inc.,
dismissed claims that the defendants violated ERISA fiduciary duties by
failing to disclose to plan participants that the company was in a

60.
61.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
544 U.S. 336 (2005).

62. Id. at 346.
63. Id. at 347.
64.

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

65. See Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (D.N.J. 2008).
66. See, e.g., Edgar v. Avaya, 503 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
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"precarious financial situation" following a merger. 67 The court rejected
the claim for failure to plead loss causation: "due to the almost
immediate market internalization of any announcement by [the
defendant], no loss to Plaintiff could be linked to the alleged
wrongdoing. 68 In contrast, the court in In re Honeywell International
ERISA Litigation69 rejected this argument, reasoning that, while full
disclosure may not have prevented the losses incurred by the plan on
stock already held, disclosure would have prevented the plan from
acquiring additional company stock at an inflated price.7 °
5. The ERISA Lawsuit Is Not Only Subject to
Less Stringent Discovery Rules But May Also
Allow Securities Plaintiffs to Bypass the
Discovery Safeguards of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss by a defendant in a securities
action, the PSLRA provides that there will be an automatic stay in
discovery, unless the plaintiff will suffer undue prejudice or a loss of
evidence.] Without the ability to engage in discovery, plaintiffs face a
higher cost in identifying specific misleading statements and omissions,
and in determining their materiality. Plaintiffs' lawyers, unable to
increase the amount of information against defendants or to pursue an
aggressive discovery strategy, are less likely to obtain a large settlement
or to reach the merits of the case.
In contrast, ERISA civil actions are subject to the full set of
discovery rules established in Federal Rule Civil Procedure 26(b)ERISA allows parties to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
72
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.
Moreover, some courts have been willing to lift the discovery stay in
companion securities actions where defendants have already produced
documents to plaintiffs in parallel ERISA or derivative suits. 73 In In re
67. Graden, 574 F. Supp. at 465; see also Jo-el Meyer, CourtFinds Nondisclosure of Merger
Snags Wasn't a Breach; Other ERISA Claims Survive, 8 PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) 168
(Aug. 29, 2008).
68. Graden, 574 F. Supp. at 465; see also Meyer, supra note 67, at 168.
69. In re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litig., No. 03-1214 (DRD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585
(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2004).
70. Id. at*41-42.
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B)(2006).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
73. Sherrie R. Shavett, Plaintiffs' Vision of Securities Litigation: Trends/Strategies in 2005-
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WorldCom, Inc. Securities Master File Litigation,74 the court held that

the intended purpose of the discovery stay-minimizing frivolous class
action filings and preventing "fishing expeditions"-should not prevent
the securities plaintiffs from having access to documents already made
available to the U.S. Attorney, the SEC, and plaintiffs in a separate
ERISA action.75 Strategically, filing an ERISA lawsuit in addition to the
securities action may allow plaintiffs to circumvent the discovery
safeguards of the PSLRA and deploy the tools of discovery to uncover
wrongdoing or exert settlement pressures.
B. Scope of Remedies

Defrauded investors who satisfy the elements of Rule lOb-5 may
recover out-of-pocket monetary "actual damages. '' 76 However, because
the Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action is implied, neither section 10(b) nor
section 10(b)(5) establishes specific measurements for damages.7 7 The
78
Supreme Court in Affiliated UTE Citizens of Utah v. United States,
outlined the traditional "out-of-pocket" theory for damages in Rule l Ob5 claims: damages would be measured by the difference between the
value of what the seller received for the shares and the fair market value

of the shares at the time of the sale. 79 When the defendant received more
than the seller's actual loss, damages are the amount of the defendant's
profit. 80 Even though section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 8 1 and

section 21D(e) of the PSLRA 82 provide definitions regarding damages,
the law remains open ended in regard to recovery. For instance, the
Second Circuit has allowed "benefit of the bargain" damages under Rule
2007, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007, at 57, 108 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B- 1620).
74. 234 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
75. Id. at 305; see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec., & ERISA Litig., 220 F.R.D. 246, 252
(D. Md. 2004) (lifting stay where documents had been produced to government agencies and were
going to be produced to the ERISA plaintiffs).
76. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 28a, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006).
77. See generally Ana Morales Olazabal, Analyst and Broker-Dealer Liability Under 10(b)
for Biased Stock Recommendations, I N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 76 (2004); Robert B. Thompson, The
Measure Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV.
349, 355 (1984).
78. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
79. Id. at 155.
80. Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLSRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(e),
109 Stat. 737, 74-49 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995)) (adding Sec. Exch. Act §
21 D(e)(1)).
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1Ob-5 but only "where misrepresentation is made in the tender offer and
proxy solicitation materials as to the consideration to be forthcoming
upon an intended merger., 83 Otherwise, a plaintiffs lost profits are not
recoverable in Rule lOb-5 actions.84
Whereas recovery under the securities law is limited to actual
damages, the scope of remedies under ERISA is broader than under Rule
lOb-5. ERISA provides two main avenues for relief for a breach of
fiduciary duty. First, under ERISA section 502(a)(2), the Secretary of
Labor, a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may sue to seek relief for a
breach of fiduciary duty authorized by section 409 of ERISA.85 Section
409(a) makes a fiduciary who breaches his fiduciary responsibilities
personally liable "to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits
of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of assets of the
Second, ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes suits by
plan. '8 6
beneficiaries or fiduciaries to recover "appropriate equitable
participants,
87
relief.,
Until recently, the Supreme Court applied its precedent to bar
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2) if the
remedy inured to an individual or an individual account and not to "the
plan as a whole. ' 88 The Supreme Court revisited this interpretation of
89
section 502(a)(2) in LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg & Associates Inc.,
holding that section 502(a)(2) "authorize[s] recovery for fiduciary
breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual
account." 90
Relying on LaRue, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
recently held in Rogers v. Baxter International Inc., 91 that the
beneficiary of a defined-contribution account who suffered a loss

83. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir.198 1).
84. See, e.g., Three Crown Ltd. P'ship v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 876, 890
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
85. 29U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
86. Id. § 1109(a).
87. Id. § I132(a)(3)(B).
88. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,' 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (holding that recovery
under section 502(a)(2) must "inure... to the benefit of the plan as a whole").
89. No. 06-856, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008).
90. Id. at 8. LaRue, a participant in DeWolff's 401(k) plan, instructed the administrator and a
fiduciary of the plan to make certain changes to his 401(k) plan. His instructions were not followed
and, as a result, LaRue's individual account plan was depleted by approximately $150,000.00. See
LaRue v. Dewolff, Boberg & Assocs., 450 F.3d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 2006), vacated 128 S.Ct. 1020
(2008).
91. 521 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
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attributable to a pension plan fiduciary's alleged imprudent investment
may obtain relief even though other participants are uninjured.92
Therefore, post-LaRue, claims filed under section 502(a)(2), by plan
participants whose individual retirement plans have been depleted or
depreciated by fiduciary breach arising out of misrepresentations or
nondisclosures, will not
be dismissed on the ground that there was no
93
plan.
entire
the
loss to
Also important to misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims is
footnote 4 of the opinion, where Justice Stevens notes that "[section]
' 94
502(a)(2) encompasses appropriate claims for 'lost profits."'
Therefore, even if the scale of a case is insufficient to give rise to plan
wide litigation, if only one participant suffers a significant loss due to a
fiduciary breach, he may bring a lawsuit to recover lost profits-that is,
"whatever would have been [in his individual account] had the plan
honored the employee's entitlement, which includes an entitlement to
prudent management., 95 The Court's conclusion that "the legal issue
under section 502(a)(2) is the same whether [the participant's] account
includes 1% or 99% of the total assets in the plan" 96 expands the scope
of ERISA remedies available to ERISA plaintiffs.
III. THE QUESTION OF DUTY

A. ERISA Duty of Disclosure
Courts have increasingly been required to consider the extent, if
any, to which ERISA's fiduciary standards encompass a fiduciary duty
to disclose information to participants beyond ERISA's express
reporting and disclosure requirements.9 7 There is a considerable amount
of confusion and inconsistencies in the case law on whether such duty

92. Id. at 705. Baxter involved plaintiffs alleging that plan fiduciaries breached the duty of
prudence by allowing participants to invest in company stock "despite knowing that [the stock] was
overpriced in the market and hence a bad deal." Id. at 704.
93. See Jo-el J. Mayer, Litigation 'Floodgates' Will Not Be Opened By Court's LaRue
Decision, 35 PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) 865 (April 15, 2008) (quoting statement by
panelist Bob Eccles ofO'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.).
94. LaRue, No. 06-856, slip op. at 5 n.4.
95. Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 2007).
96. LaRue, No. 06-856, slip op. at 4.
97. See generally Edward E. Bintz, FiduciaryResponsibility Under ERISA: Is There Ever a
Fiduciary Duty to Disclose?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 979, 981 (1993).
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exists and if so, under what circumstances it applies. 98 Over the years,
some issues have settled. The Supreme Court has made clear that when
a fiduciary speaks in a fiduciary capacity, it has a duty to speak
truthfully and completely even if those communications are not required
by ERISA. 99 Courts, however, have struggled to determine whether a
communication made or adopted by an ERISA fiduciary has a sufficient

nexus to the plan or benefits thereunder to be deemed fiduciary in
nature.
A more difficult duty question arises when the fiduciary remains
silent about a material fact that a reasonable plan participant would need
to know to protect his interest in the plan. The question of whether
ERISA's fiduciary standards encompass a duty to disclose is an "area of
developing and controversial law."' 00
A great number of ERISA

plaintiffs have argued that plan fiduciaries had a duty to disclose to them
material nonpublic information necessary to appreciate the true risk of
investing their retirement savings in company stock.' 0 1
Although some courts have refused to create affirmative disclosure
duties beyond ERISA's explicit requirements, 10 2 other courts, relying on
fiduciary principles and the law of trusts, have found that encompassed
within ERISA's fiduciary duties is an affirmative duty to disclose

material information when the fiduciary is on notice that silence might
be harmful. 10 3 These courts, however, have also struggled to determine

under which circumstances, if any, the fiduciary is on notice that silence

98. See id. (noting that no clear framework has emerged regarding whether a fiduciary duty to
disclose exists).
99. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (quoting Peoria Union Stock Yards
Co. v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (Cal. 1983) ("[L]ying is inconsistent with the
duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.").
100. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 555 (S.D.
Tex. 2003).
101. See id. (alleging that defendants breached their duty when they failed to disclose material
information regarding Enron's financial situation).
102. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995) (Congress did
not intend to supplement ERISA's reporting and disclosure scheme "by a far away provision in
another part of [ERISA.]"); Varity, 516 U.S. at 531-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ERISA does not
require employers "to keep plan participants abreast of the plan sponsor's financial security.");
Ames v. Am. Nat'l Can Co., 170 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he affirmative obligation to
disclose materials under ERISA... extends only to a defined set of documents.").
103. See, e.g., Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing
the duty of care, diligence, and loyalty imposed by a fiduciary duty); Glaziers & Glassworkers
Local 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1180 (3d Cir. 1996) (The duty of
ERISA fiduciaries to inform is "not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative
duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence might be harmful.") (quoting Bixler v. Cent. Pa.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1299, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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may be harmful, so as to trigger disclosure obligations. 10 4 Thus far, most
of these cases have settled for millions of dollars,'0 5 partly because the
case law on ERISA
disclosure duties "is complex, rapidly developing,
06
and uncertain.'

The Secretary of Labor has taken the view that: "ERISA's duties of
prudence and loyalty not only forbid fiduciaries from misleading plan
participants, but may, under some circumstances, also require fiduciaries
to disclose information that participants need to protect their interests,
even if the disclosure is not specifically requested or otherwise mandated
in ERISA's reporting and disclosure provisions."' 7 The Secretary has
recently intervened as amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs appealing to
the Seventh Circuit the lower court's dismissal of allegations that
defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose to plan
°8
participants the fees paid by the plan and revenue sharing payments.
Although not explicitly disagreeing with this holding, the Secretary
strongly rejected the district court's reasoning that "[w]here as here
Congress has by statute and related regulation, created detailed rules
governing disclosure requirements, it would be inappropriate to ignore
and augment them using the general power to define fiduciary
obligations."' 0 9 Thus, to the extent that the law is unclear, a plan
fiduciary cannot "rely on the regulatory requirements to satisfy its
disclosure obligations" even if it has not otherwise misled

104. See Palen v. Kmart Corp., 2000 WL 658115 *3 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000) (concluding that an
ERISA fiduciary is on notice that "silence might be harmful" when it provided only health
insurance information in response to plaintiff's request that defendant continue all of decedent's
benefits, even if plaintiff did not specifically mention a particular item, such as life insurance)
(quoting Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999)).
105. Select cases that have settled for many millions include: In re Delphi Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & "ERISA" Litig. 2008 WL 5111908 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2008) (ERISA claim settled
for $47 million); In Re Allegheny Energy, Inc., Sec., Litig., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (Jud. District on
Multidistrict Litig. Apr. 14, 2003) (settled for $4 million, Dec. 2006); In re AOL Time Warner Inc.
ERISA Litig., 2008 WL 5063086 (2d Cir. 2008) (settled for $100 million, Sept. 2006); In re
Broadwing ERISA Litig., 252 F.R.D. 369, 379 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (settled for $11 million, Oct.
2006); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 898 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (settled for $28
million, June 2006).
106. See Jo-el J. Meyer, GM, Employees Reach $37.5M Settlement to End ERISA Fiduciary
Breach Claims, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 18, 2008) (quoting motion for approval of
the settlement).
107. Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Elaine L. Chao, As Amicus Curiae In Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Hecker v. Deere, No. 06-C-719-S (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2008); Brief
of Secretary of Labor, Elaine L. Chao as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 10,
Hecker v. Deere, No. 07-3605, 08-1224 (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter "Amicus Brief'].
108. See Hecker v. Deere, 496 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
109. Id. at 974.
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0

1. Mandatory Disclosure Obligations
Part I of ERISA establishes a comprehensive set of reporting and
disclosure requirements."' The first requirement is that the terms of2
each employee benefit plan be set forth in a written plan document."
The plan administrator must communicate these terms in the form of a
"Summary Plan Description" ("SPD") to plan participants within ninety
days of becoming covered. 1 3 The SPD must be comprehensive in
describing a participant's and beneficiary's rights and obligations under
the plan-which includes information such as the plan's sources of
financing and the names and addresses of the people who exercise
authority over the plan. In addition, the SDP must be "written in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant" and
include information about the plan's governance that is "sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably appraise such participants
and
'
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan." 14
In addition to the SPD, the plan administrator must give
participants a Summary Annual Report ("SAR") within seven months of
the close of each plan year that summarizes the plan's financial
operations for the year." 15 In the case of a defined benefit pension plan,
the SAR must also include a statement regarding the plan's compliance
with ERISA's minimum funding standards." 6
Upon request, a
participant is entitled to receive a copy of the full annual report that the
plan administrator must file each year with the Secretary." 7 The full
annual report must
contain detailed information concerning the plan's
8
1
status."
financial
Satisfying ERISA's explicit disclosure obligations, however, does
not shield an ERISA fiduciary from liability. The Secretary of Labor

110. Amicus Brief,supranote 107, at20 (internal quotations omitted).
111. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2006).
112. Id.§ 1102(a)(l).
113. Id.§ 1024(b)(1).
114. Id.§ 1022(a); see also DiFelice v.U.S.Airways, Inc.,
397 F.Supp.2d 758, 768 (E.D.Va.
2005).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3).
116. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10 (2008). ERISA's minimum funding standards apply to
defined benefit pension plans and money purchase pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1081.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4).
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(1)(b); 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1(b); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2520.103-5(c).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

17

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 26:497

has noted that "[n]othing in the text of the Act or the regulations
governing annual reports (Forms 5500) and summary plan descriptions
indicates that those requirements were intended to be the exclusive
disclosure obligations under ERISA, or purport to qualify in any way the
general fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty."' 19
2. Duty to Speak Truthfully and Completely
When an ERISA fiduciary communicates with plan participants in20a
fiduciary capacity, it has a duty to speak truthfully and completely.1
The seminal Supreme Court case spurring causes of action for fiduciary
misrepresentations is Varity Corp. v. Howe. 12 In Varity, the company
had spun off a number of its non-profitable divisions to a separately
incorporated subsidiary and intentionally misled its employees to think
that their benefits
would remain secured if they transferred to the new
22
1
company.
The Supreme Court held that Varity was acting in its fiduciary
capacity because a reasonable employee "could have thought that Varity
was communicating with them both in its capacity as employer and its
capacity as plan administrator,"' 123 and that it breached its fiduciary
duties by knowingly misrepresenting the security of the transferred
employees' future benefits. 24 The Supreme Court made clear, however,
that a company does not act as a fiduciary "simply because it made
statements about its expected financial condition or because 'an ordinary
business decision tum[ed] out to have an adverse impact on the
plan."",125 Instead, the Court found a fiduciary breach because the
company knowingly connected materially misleading statements about
the subsidiary's financial health to statements it made about future
about the security of
benefits "so that its intended communication
' 26
benefits was rendered materially misleading."'
Under the Court's reasoning in Varity, communications by the
company in SEC filings or corporate communications about the health of
the company or its stock would not be actionable unless given in

119. Amicus Brief supra note 107, at 20.
120. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
121. Id. at489.
122. Id. at 493-94.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 503.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 505 (citation omitted).

Id.
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connection with implicit or explicit advice to plan participants about the
suitability of investing in company stock.1 27 To give rise to liability
under Varity, there must be link between the false or misleading
information about the company and a fiduciary discretionary decision to
disseminate such information in a manner reasonably calculated to
influence plan participants' benefits decisions.
For instance, in In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litigation,128 the court
denied a motion to dismiss claims that defendants had made material
misrepresentations to plan participants. 29 The court noted that the
misleading statements in question were contained in an employee
newsletter that was disseminated with the intent to recommend plan
participants to invest more heavily in the company stock.1 30 Thus,
having disseminated false or misleading material information
sufficiently relevant to plan benefits decisions-a fiduciary discretionary
decision-the company was on notice that silence could be harmful and
had a duty to disclose to the extent necessary to correct or make the
previous statements not misleading.131
Courts, however, have disagreed as to whether false or misleading
statements in SEC filings are per se fiduciary by reason of incorporation
into the SPD, or whether dissemination is required to give rise to
fiduciary liability. Absent additional facts, most courts have found that
such act of incorporation as required by ERISA section 404(c) 132 does
not involve any fiduciary discretion and therefore, does not give rise to
fiduciary liability. 33
Some courts have allowed a theory of
incorporation by reference to survive the motion to dismiss level,
reasoning that anything incorporated into the SPD may be deemed a

127. See id.
128. 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Kan. 2004).
129. Id. at 1229.
130. Id. at 1228.
131. See id. at 1228; see also In re Polaroid ERISA Litig., 362 F. Supp. 2d 461, 477-79
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for failure to inform by alleging that the
defendants had "creat[ed] an inaccurate impression of the future prospects of the Company"); In re
Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 672-73, 682 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (plaintiff
stated a claim for failure to inform because defendant fiduciaries misled participants in 401 (k) about
risks of investment in company stock in its public filings); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F.
Supp. 2d 898, 916 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (duty to inform exists when defendants provided misleading
information about soundness of company stock).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).
133. See In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 2004 WL 2903889, at *6 (D.N.H. Dec. 2,
2004) (noting that "[a]lthough plaintiffs plainly had a right to expect that Tyco International would
refrain from making material misstatements in its SEC filings, that expectation must be enforced
under the securities laws rather than ERISA").
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13 4

fiduciary communication.
Other courts have reasoned that false or misleading statements in
SEC filings are actionable only if the fiduciary decides to speak by
disseminating the statements to plan participants in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence a benefits decision. For instance, the court in In
re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litigation135 held that misrepresentations in SEC
filings that had been incorporated into the SPD became actionable only
when the company encouraged plan participants to review the filings
carefully.136 The court reasoned, consistent with Varity, that such
communication was sufficiently related to benefits decisions to be
deemed fiduciary and to trigger a duty to speak truthfully and thus to
investigate before speaking. 37 The court noted, however, that had the
fiduciaries not disseminated the information, they would not have
assumed an independent duty to investigate and correct3 statements
about
8
the stock made by non-fiduciaries via securities filings.
3. Duty to Correct
The duty to speak truthfully and completely also encompasses a
duty to correct mistakes in previous fiduciary communications when
information later reveals that the communication was false when
made. 39 The difficult issue arises when an ERISA fiduciary adopts or
disseminates to plan participants a non-fiduciary statement that,
unbeknown to the fiduciary, is false or misleading when made. As
previously noted, courts disagree as to whether false or misleading
statements in SEC filings are per se fiduciary communications or
whether dissemination is required to give rise to fiduciary liability.
Even though ERISA does not impose affirmative disclosure
140
obligations to correct the misstatements of others made to the market,
134.

See In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

("ERISA fiduciaries, however, cannot in violation of their fiduciary obligations disseminate false
information to plan participants, including false information contained in SEC filings."); see also
Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 876-77 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("Defendants had a duty under
securities laws not to make any material misrepresentations; they also had a duty to disseminate
truthful information to plan participants, including the information contained in SEC filings....
[T]heir duties under ERISA and securities law co-exist.").
135.

309 F. Supp. 2d 861 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

136. Id. at 890.
137. Id. at 889-90.
138. Id. at 890.
139. See In re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litig., No. 03-1214(DRD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21585, at *29 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2004).
140. In re Dynegy, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 884-85.
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some courts have stated that if a fiduciary makes or disseminates a
statement sufficiently related to a benefits decision, he is under a duty to
investigate before speaking, to speak truthfully, and to correct statements
made by non-fiduciaries, even if those statements are made in securities
filings. 14 1 For instance, in In re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litigation,142 the

court accepted plaintiffs theory that plan fiduciaries that distributed the
SPD thereby adopted the misleading statement in SEC filings and had an
affirmative duty to correct subsequent SEC disclosures to the extent they
knew
that
the43 subsequent
filings
contained
material
misrepresentations.1
The case law suggests that a duty to correct can only arise if (i) the
person who made or disseminated the particular statement was a
fiduciary to the plan; (ii) the false or misleading statement was
sufficiently related to the plan or benefits thereunder to be deemed
fiduciary under Varity; (iii) the fiduciary knows or should know (through
reasonable investigation) that the communication was false or
misleading when made; and, (iv) a reasonable plan participant
would
144
rely on the statements in making benefits-related decisions.
4. Duty to Update and/or to Warn
Varity involved a company knowingly connecting materially
misleading statements about the financial health of its subsidiary to
statements it made about future benefits. The Supreme Court, however,
specifically reserved the question of "whether ERISA fiduciaries have
any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own

141.

Id. at 890; see also Shirk v. Fifth Third Bancorp, No. 05-CV-49, 2007 WL 1100429, at

*12-13 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2007) (alleged misrepresentations made in SEC filings established an
"actionable" basis for plaintiffs claiming that defendants failed to provide "complete and accurate
information... made material misrepresentations... [and] conveyed inaccurate information . .
142. No. 03-1214(DRD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2004).
143. Id. at *29; see also In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 03-1204(KSH), 2007
WL 2374989, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2007) (Defendants "were required to speak fully and
truthfully" once they decided to speak on the issue of the SPD, and even though "ERISA does not
require fiduciaries to disclose this type of information to Plan participants, fiduciaries who make the
choice to provide such information must provide all pieces of information necessary to paint the full
picture of the company's financial health.").
144. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 503, 505 (1996) (defendant, as employer and
plan administrator, could be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty when deceptive statements were
made regarding the status employee benefits); see also Schied v. Dynergy, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d
861, 890 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (duty to initiate disclosures arises when fiduciaries have "knowledge of
material information that they know the plan participants do not know, but need to know, to protect
their interests").
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initiative, or in response to employee inquiries."'' 45 Thus, a more
controversial issue is whether a fiduciary has a duty to warn participants
or update them about financial and business developments if
circumstances have changed to an extent that participants are acting
upon information or representations about the company that are no
longer accurate.
The requirement that fiduciaries speak truthfully means that their
statements must be true when made. 146 Thus, courts have generally
found that the duty not to mislead is not breached if subsequent
developments make an earlier communication or representation false or
materially misleading. 147 Whereas the duty to correct may be derived
from the general duty not to mislead or misrepresent, the duty to update
must be analyzed solely as a subset of the more controversial duty to
speak when the fiduciary is on notice that silence might be harmful.
Several courts applying ERISA fiduciary standards have found a
duty to update written statements if the fiduciary knows or should know
that the communications have become misleading because a change in
course is under serious consideration. 148 Other courts have imposed an
affirmative duty to inform or warn participants "where a fiduciary has
reason to know of a particular beneficiary's need for information" and
thus is on notice that silence would be harmful.1 49 Such limited duty
only arises "if there was some particular reason that the fiduciary should
have known that his failure to convey information would be harmful."' 50
Other courts have found such duty to exist only if the fiduciary has
promised to update the participants on certain matters.' 5 1 This
145. Varity, 516 U.S. at 506.
146. See Swinney v. GMC, 46 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that statements made
by an ERISA fiduciary must be true representations at the time they are made, but such does not
foreclose changes to the plan offerings in the future as circumstances evolve).
147. See, e.g., id. at 520 (An employer is not liable for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA if
"the statements were made in good faith and the statements indicated the employer's actual intent at
the time.") (citing Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 544 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
148. McAuley v. IBM Corp. Inc., 165 F.3d 1038, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that SPDs
should remain accurate and non-misleading throughout the availability of the plan, thus finding a
duty to correct any misleading information and to update any information that has become
misleading).
149. Stabile, supra note 7, at 399 (citing Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 452
(3d Cir. 2000); Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir.
1993); Barker v. Am. Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Hamilton v.
Allen-Bradley Corp., 244 F.3d 819, 826-27 (1lth Cir. 2001) (discussing precedent sa,.ying a
fiduciary must provide complete and accurate information to participants when they request it).
150. Watson v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114-15 (1st Cir. 2002).
151. See Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Broga v.
Ne. Utils., 315 F. Supp. 2d 212, 250-51 (D. Conn. 2004) (noting that the duty to inform participants
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affirmative disclosure duty, however, has generally been found in cases
"concerning plan terms and requirements, matters of plan administration,
' 52
or tax or other legal issues affecting participant plan elections."
The question arises whether fiduciaries would have a duty to update
participants of material non-public business or financial developments
that render investment in the company stock imprudent where the
fiduciary is on notice that the participants need such information to
protect their assets. On the one hand, courts have made clear that "plan
administrators are not required to inform all [p]lan participants and
beneficiaries of every corporate event, especially contingent events, that
might impact the value of the company's common stock."1 53 On the
other extreme, when "fraudulent acts threaten to impair and diminish the
value of the plan's investment,"' 54 a breach of duty may lie where the
fiduciary fails to take steps to protect the assets of the plan. 55
B. DisclosureDuties Under the Securities Laws
Disclosure is at the heart of federal securities laws. 56 However, the
securities disclosure architecture stands on the foundational stone that
materiality of a piece of information is a necessity but, standing alone, is
not a sufficient condition to require its disclosure. 57 Some information
may be material, such as that that is, likely to be important to the
reasonable investor, 58 but an issuer may have no duty to disclose it
unless it has: (i) a duty to disclose the information as required by the
SEC, (ii) a duty to speak truthfully and completely, (iii) a duty to correct,
(iv) a limited duty to update (in some circuits), (v) a duty to disclose or

of changes depends on the nature of inquiries and activities of the fiduciary).
152. Stabile, supra note 7, at 400 (citing In re Unysis Corp., 242 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2001)
(discussing possible affirmative duty to correct plaintiffs' mistaken belief that they were entitled to
lifetime health plans); Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding an affirmative duty to disclose where plaintiff made specific inquiry regarding disability
benefits)).
153. Sweeney v. Kroger Co., 773 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (E.D. Mo. 1991); see also Cokenour v.
Household Int'l Inc., No. 02C7921, 2004 WL 725973, at *8 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 31, 2004) (noting that
defendants are not required "to continuously gather and disclose nonpublic information bearing
some relation to the plan sponsor's financial condition").
154. Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 963, 969 (D.N.J. 1992).
155. Id.
156. Donald Langevoort, The Muddled Duty to Disclose under Rule lOb-5, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1639, 1640 (2004).
157. See id. at 1644 (citing Baron v. Smith, 285 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103 (D. Mass. 2003)).
158. See generally JAMES COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS, 56263 (4th ed. 2004).
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abstain, or (vi) a duty to disclose publicly information selective
disclosed (Regulation FD). 159 Even though material misrepresentation
by the issuer is always actionable under Rule lOb-5, the difficult
questions regarding a company's duty arise when the company chooses
to speak in a way that is not a clear misrepresentation of the truth, or
when the company chooses to remain silent. 160
1. Duty to Disclose Information Required By the SEC
It is well established that a material misrepresentation in a
document filed with the SEC leads to liability under section 18 of the
Exchange Act and to Rule 1Ob-5 exposure. 161 The difficult question is
whether investors are entitled to rely on the completeness of required
disclosure items. Courts have generally refused to find a duty to
disclose arising out of line-item disclosure requirements so that silence is
not actionable under Rule 1Ob-5 for remaining silent when disclosure
162
was required.
C. Management Discussionand Analysis
Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K requires issuers to disclose known
trends and uncertainties (except for merger negotiations) that are
reasonably likely to occur, unless management determines that even if
the uncertainty comes to fruition, it will not have a material effectfavorable or unfavorable--on the registrant's financial condition or
operations. 163 Even though the SEC has explicitly required such
disclosure, courts have generally refused to find that there is a fraudbased duty to disclose "known trends and uncertainties" under item
303(a), possibly because
of its forward-looking nature or its heightened
164
materiality standard.
For instance, in Oran v. Stafford,165 the Third Circuit held that a
private right of action for alleged violations of Item 303(a) of Regulation

159.
160.
161.
162.
Chiarella
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 599-600.
Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1640.
Id. at 1653.
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:A PostRestatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1,4-7 (1982).
Prospective Information, 8 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 62,841-42 (Apr. 23, 2008).
See Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1651, 1653.
226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).
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S-K does not exist. 166 The court reasoned that a violation of Item 303 is
not the equivalent of a section 10(b) violation as a matter of law because
the materiality tests under SK-303 differs greatly from the materiality
tests for securities fraud. 167 However, at least one district court has held
that allegations claiming 68a violation of Item 303 could support valid
claims under Rule 10b-5.
D. Form 8-K
In response to the recent corporate scandals and the adoption of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act 169 ("SOX"), there may be a trend towards requiring
more real-time disclosure of corporate events. Section 409 of SOX
authorizes the SEC to require public companies to disclose material
changes in the financial or operational condition of the issuer on a "rapid
and current basis."'' 70 Even though section 409 is "intended to provide
investors with better and faster disclosure of important corporate
events," 171 the SEC has interpreted this invitation narrowly by
incorporating new categories of events that trigger 8-K filings and
shortening the disclosure deadline, but generally confining these 7events
2
to extraordinary and out-of-the-course of business developments. 1
The SEC also adopted a limited safe harbor from public and private
claims under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 for a failure to
timely file a Form 8-K for seven items.1 73 Material misstatements or
omissions in a Form 8-K, however, remain subject to section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 liability. 174 In addition, the safe harbor extends only until the
166. Id. at 287 ("Neither the language of the regulation nor the SEC's interpretative releases
construing [Item 303] suggest that it was intended to establish a private cause of action); see also In
re Pac. Gateway Exch., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-00-1211 PJH, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8014, at *41
(N.D. Cal. May 3, 2002) (holding that "no private right of action [exists] in a [section] 10(b) case
based on an allegation of non-compliance with Regulation S-K").
167. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (quoting Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608
(N.D. Cal. 1991)).
168. See In re Campbell Soup Co. Sees. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 591 (D.N.J. 2001)
(holding that "a publisher's failure to disclose trends in declining sales and increasing returns, as
required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K, adequately alleged a securities law violation") (citing In re
Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 70-75 (2d Cir. 2001)).
169. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
various sections of 15 U.S.C. (2002)).
170. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(l).
171. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424, 82 SEC Docket 1480 (June 7, 2004).
172. Id. at 1489-90.
173. Id. at 1499-1501.
174. Id. at 1482.
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due date of the company's next periodic report. 175 "Failure to make such
disclosure in the periodic report will subject a company to potential
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, in addition176to the potential
liability under [Exchange Act] [s]ection 13(a) or 15(d)."'
1. Duty to Speak Truthfully and Completely
Even if not required, when a corporation chooses to speak with the
intention of influencing investors, whether in public statements or SEC
mandatory disclosure items, there is a duty to speak truthfully and
completely. 177 Courts agree that materially misleading public statements
or misrepresentations in forms 10-K or 10-Q and other mandatory
disclosure items give rise to Rule lOb-5 exposure. 178 Thus, if private
information makes public statements materially misleading, courts
generally have found a contemporaneous duty to disclose to the extent
necessary to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading.1 79 This duty, however, is limited
because courts are very reluctant to find a disclosed statement
misleading.' 80 This is so even if the disclosed statement is not qualified
or accompanied by an appraisal, prediction
or estimate that is materially
18
inconsistent with the disclosed statement. '
Statements of opinion may also be actionable under the antifraud
provisions if they are objectively false. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 82 the Supreme Court held that directors' recommendation to
shareholders to approve a going-private transaction because the offer
was a "fair price" and a "high value," was objectively false because the
175. Id. at 1500.
176. Id.
177. Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1640; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 229 (1988)
(implicitly finding that there was no general duty to disclose merger talks, but concluding that
liability existed where a corporation chose to speak untruthfully); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 857-65 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
178. Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1647-48.
179. See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting SEC v.Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d
738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997).
180. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that it
was not a material omission for the management of a target company to report to stockholders
higher nine-month earnings and not also to disclose an internal projection for a year-end decline in
earnings); see also Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985), (holding that
there is a duty to disclose "projections and asset appraisals ... only if the predictions underlying
[them] are substantially certain to hold").
181. See, e.g., Panter,64 F.2d at 293; Starlanan, 772 F.2d at 241.
182. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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directors had objective evidence before them that was inconsistent with
their professed opinion. 183 Under this reasoning, a statement of opinion
may be actionable under Rule lOb-5 but only if the opinion is
deceptive-in other words, it is objectively wrong and the speaker
knows it. Such feigned opinions are properly deemed untrue statements
of fact.
2. Duty to Correct
A corollary of the duty not to mislead or misrepresent is the duty to
correct mistakes in previous disclosure documents or statements. The
duty to correct applies when a company makes a material statement that,
at the time made, it believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently
discovered information actually was not. For instance, in In re
Healthcare Compare Corp. Securities Litigation,'84 the court found that
a company would have a duty to correct upon discovering information
already in existence regarding patient enrollments, even if misstatements
to participants were made without management's knowledge. 185 As to
erroneous statements made by third parties, courts generally hold that
there is no duty to correct statements by others unless the company has
"place[d] its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the [third party's
statements].186
3. Duty to Update
Courts disagree as to whether there is a duty to update previously
disclosed information if new developments make it untrue or materially
misleading. Whereas some circuits have rejected a duty to update, 18' a
few circuit courts have recognized such duty in limited circumstances
where the nature of the statement is such that it explicitly or implicitly

183. Id. at 1088, 1090, 1094-95, 1098; see William 0. Fisher, Opinions and Predictions:
Remembering Objective Falsity, INSIGHTS, Vol. 15, No. 9, Sept. 2001, at 16.
184. 75 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1996).
185. Id. at 282 ("a duty to correct [arises] by alleging facts sufficient to demonstrate that
[undisclosed information] was certain and reliable, not merely a tentative estimate").
186. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
187. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808-10 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that
"[wle do not have a system of continuous disclosure .... Rule lOb-5 condemns only fraud, and a
corporation does not commit fraud by standing on its rights under a periodic-disclosure system.");
see also Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that if a
company makes a historical statement that was accurate when made, it has no duty to update it
based upon subsequent events).
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invites future reliance and operates as a continuing representation of its
188
accuracy. For instance, in In re Time Warner Securities Litigation,
the Second Circuit recognized the possibility of liability for failure to
update when Time Warner hyped strategic alliances as a source of debt
financing while also considering an equity offering as an alternative
source of financing.' 89 The court held that when a company announces a
goal "as well as an intended approach for reaching it, [the corporation]
may come under an obligation to disclose other approaches to reaching
the goal when those approaches are under active and serious
consideration."'1 90
Similarly, in Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 191 the Third Circuit found
a duty to update about merger negotiations that would cause the
company to exceed the amount of debt allowed under its previously
announced policy of an appropriate debt-equity ratio. 192 However, even
the courts accepting a duty to update have been careful to distinguish
forward-looking statements about company policy-such as the
financing strategy in Time Warner or the capitalization policy in
Weiner-from forward-looking statements about the ordinary course of
business matters,
such as pricing strategies, 193 that need not be
194
"updated."

In contrast, other courts have emphatically rejected a duty to
update. In Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories,195 Judge Easterbrook
stated the creation of a duty to update was the province of the SEC or
Congress and not the courts. 19 6 He reasoned that imposing such duty
would effectively mandate continuous reporting and that "judges have
no authority to scoop the political branches and adopt continuous

188. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
189. Id. at 262, 267; see also Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 n.33 (lst Cir.
1996) (finding that, although there may be some circumstances where a company is subject to a
duty to update, no such duty exists for "cautiously optimistic comments that would not be
actionable in the first instance").
190. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268.
191. 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997).
192. Id. at 318.
193. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Phillip Morris Cos., 75
F.3d 801, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to impose a duty to update with respect to a sudden
chance in a company's cigarette pricing strategy).
194. See id. at 810 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)
(noting that a duty to update about ordinary business matters would "bury shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information")).
195. 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2001).
196. Id. at 809-10. ("[A] corporation does not commit fraud by standing on its rights under a
periodic-disclosure system.").
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disclosure under the banner of Rule 1Ob-5"' 97 when it was previously
established that "firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as
well as bad news) unless positive law creates a duty to disclose."' 98
However, even if the circuit recognizes a duty to update, it would be
very narrow in scope because most corporate statements speak to the
current state of the company and do not operate as a continuing
representation. 199 In addition, an issuer should be able to defeat any duty
language its intention
to update claim by disclaiming in plain and clear
200
statement.
a
update
to
to take on a responsibility
4. Duty to Disclose or Abstain
Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits corporate insiders from trading company stock
on the basis of material nonpublic information known to one party of the
trade but not the other.20 '
Trading on such information qualifies as a "deceptive device" under
[section] 10(b), . . . because "a relationship of trust and confidence
[exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position
with that corporation.". .. That relationship... "gives rise to a duty to
disclose [or to abstain from trading] because of the 'necessity of
tak[ing] unfair advantage of..
preventing a corporate insider from...
20 2
uninformed... stockholders.'
The insider-trading prohibition applies to sales of an employer's
stock by ERISA fiduciaries and plans that acquire material nonpublic
information. 20 3 In order to avoid insider-trading liability, a fiduciary

197. Id. at 809.
198. Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted).
199. See Langevoort, supra note 156, 1668 (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410,1431 (3d Cir. 1997)).
200. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1432 (stating that whether the
issuer has a duty to update depends on whether the company's initial statement contained an
implicit representation that the company would update investors or not).
201. See U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) ("classical" insider trading occurs
when company insiders buy or sell their company's stock while in possession of material, nonpublic
information).
202. Id. at 652 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980)).
203. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7881, 3443154, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1672 at *79-86 (Aug. 15, 2000) (plan administrator cannot influence
buying or selling of shares by plan while in possession of material, nonpublic information); see also
Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., No. CIV.A.3:00-778-17, 2001 WL 1836286, at *7-8 (D.S.C. Feb.
9, 200 1) (finding no duty to provide inside information to the Plan).
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who has access to non-public information must either disclose such
information to the public or abstain from trading.0 4 Thus, neither the
ERISA plan nor the ERISA fiduciary can sell the employer stock that the
plan already holds based upon confidential non-public information
because such action would violate insider-trading laws.20 5
A plan sponsor could also be subject to liability for insider trading
as a tipper if it provided material nonpublic information to the plan or its
participants. The plan sponsor would be held liable only when it passed
the information for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, some
personal or economic benefit.20 6 Although the necessary type of benefit
has not been precisely defined, the SEC takes the position that intangible
benefits, such as a desire to enhance one's reputation, are sufficient.20 7
Accordingly, a desire to confer a benefit on employees or avoid a breach
of fiduciary duty claim may also be sufficient to establish tipping
liability. 208 Thus, neither fiduciaries nor participants can trade while in
possession of material, nonpublic information.20 9
5. Duty to Disclose Publicly Information Selectively Disclosed
Regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure") prohibits selective disclosure of
inside information concerning company stock to any "holder of the
issuer's securities, under circumstances in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer's securities on
the basis of the information., 210 Thus, if a selective disclosure is made
to a party who will be trading on the information, such as a 401(k) plan
participant, full public disclosure is required simultaneously if the
disclosure was made on purpose. 1 Public disclosure may be made
subsequent to the trading only when the selective disclosure was

204. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release Nos. 6668, 34-6668, 40 SEC 907,
911 (Nov. 8, 1961) (adopting the 'disclose or abstain' principle).
205. See 29 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(l) (2006) (providing civil penalty for a person who directly or
indirectly controls a person who engages in insider trading, where the controlling person knew or
recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the person would engage in insider trading and failed to
take appropriate steps to prevent it).
206. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659, 662 (1983).
207. See Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 48 SEC Docket 739 (Mar. 19, 1991).
208. See generally Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (finding there may be an inference of liability if the
tipper receives consideration or benefit in exchange for information).
209. See id. at 659-60; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33,7881 and 34,43154, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1672 at *79-86 (Aug. 15, 2000).
210. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2008).
211. Id. § 2 43.100(a)(I).
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accidental. 212 "A [Regulation FD] violation requires neither scienter nor
breach of any fiduciary duty, but is enforceable only by the SEC ' , 213 and
does not give rise to Rule lOb-5 liability.214 Thus, if a corporate insider
who is also an ERISA fiduciary communicates information about the
possibility of accounting fraud or other material information about the
company solely to employees who will be trading on the information,
the fiduciary may be subject to a cease-and-desist order, judicial
enforcement action, or a civil penalty.2 15
IV. OVERLAPPING, CONTRADICTORY, OR COMPLIMENTARY
DISCLOSURE CLAIMS?

A lawsuit actionable under ERISA and securities law, and
"aris[ing] out of a common nucleus of operative fact[s]," may be
"combined and brought before one judge for coordinated or consolidated
proceedings. 16 However, the general "consensus is that the numerous
distinctions between the securities fraud and ERISA cases" warrant both
separate coordination and separate trial.21 7 For instance, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio recently declined to
transfer a proposed ERISA fiduciary breach class action against Macy's
to a New York federal court where two securities lawsuits were pending
based on the same misrepresentations and nondisclosures. 218 The court
reasoned that, even though similar, "[the] ERISA matter and the
securities action in New York are not identical [to] necessarily require
transfer" even though such transfer would promote judicial economy. 219
Whereas this reasoning may hold true for misrepresentation and
failure to correct claims, the inevitable intersection between the ERISA
and securities nondisclosure claims make it difficult, if not impossible,
212. Id. § 243.100(a)(2).
213. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, New Standards of Director Loyalty and Care in the
Post-Enron Era: Are Some Shareholders More Equal Than Others?, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 279, 285 (2005).
214. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2008) ("No failure to make a public disclosure
required solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule lOb-5 . . . under the
Securities Exchange Act.").
215. See generally Muir & Schipani, supra note 213, at 285 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)
(2004)).
216. Robert Rachal, Howard Shapiro & Nicole Eichberger, Fiduciary Duties Regarding 401(k)
and ESOP Investments in Employer Stock, in ERISA LITIGATION 783, 790 (Jayne E. Zanglein &
Susan J. Stabile eds., 2008).
217. Id.
218. Shanehchian v. Macy's Inc., 251 F.R.D. 287, 289, 292 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
219. Id. at 292.
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to determine the disclosure duties of ERISA fiduciaries, if any, without a
clear reference to whether there was a duty to disclose the information
under the securities laws.
A. Misrepresentationand Failureto Correct Claims
ERISA fiduciary misrepresentation and securities fraud are distinct
causes of action that intersect incidentally: only fiduciary
communications are actionable under ERISA, the standard of materiality
may be different, and a fiduciary breach need not constitute fraud or be
committed with scienter as required by a Rule lOb-5 action. Thus, a
showing of ERISA fiduciary breach based on a misrepresentation need
not be grounded on a securities law violation.
Conversely, a
misrepresentation that is actionable under the securities laws need not
give rise to ERISA liability if it is not fiduciary in nature.
1. A False or Misleading Statement Is Actionable Under
ERISA Only If It Is a Fiduciary Communication
As previously established, both ERISA and the securities laws
impose a duty not to mislead or misrepresent. Whereas there is no
fiduciary requirement under the securities laws, actionability of a false
or misleading statement under ERISA depends on whether the fiduciary
makes, adopts or disseminates the false or misleading statement in a
fiduciary capacity-that is, the statement is sufficiently related to the
plan or benefits thereunder to satisfy the Varity standard. 220 As the
Varity decision noted, a company does not act as an ERISA fiduciary
"simply because it made statements about its expected financial
condition.,, 22 1 Those statements must be linked to statements about plan
benefits in order to be actionable under ERISA.2 22 In this sense, the
standard of actionability is more stringent than the securities law
standard.
There is one potential gray area blurring the distinction between
corporate communications and fiduciary communications-whether
statements in SEC filings that have been incorporated in the SPD, or
public statements of the company that have been disseminated by plan
fiduciaries would be deemed fiduciary communications for purposes of

220.
221.

See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505 (1996).

222. Id.
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ERISA. The judicial consensus seems to be that mere incorporation of
SEC filings into the SPD is not a fiduciary act.223 Liability would
require that the information be made or disseminated by an ERISA
fiduciary in a manner reasonably calculated to influence plan
participants' benefits decisions; and that the fiduciary knows or should
know that the information was false or misleading when made. 24
2. The ERISA Standard of Materiality May Be Lower Than the
Securities Standard
A statement is material in the ERISA benefits-related context "if
there was a substantial likelihood that it would have misled a reasonable
participant in making an adequately informed decision about whether to
place or maintain monies in a particular fund., 225 Under the securities
law, information is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that [its]
disclosure .

.

. would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as

having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
Whereas some communications may be deemed
available. 22 6
immaterial under the securities law, an immaterial misrepresentation
may invite greater reliance by plan participants if the statement is made,
endorsed or disseminated by a plan fiduciary.
For instance, a statement may be deemed "puffery" for purposes of
securities litigation because a reasonable investor would find it
unimportant to the total mix of information available to the market.
However, if the same statement is endorsed or disseminated by a plan
fiduciary, it may be taken more seriously by plan participants whobecause of lack of sophistication or a greater belief in the competence of
plan fiduciaries, rely more heavily on their recommendations. Thus, a
false or misleading statement may not be deemed material enough to
establish the type of fraud that is actionable under Rule 1Ob-5. But the
fiduciary who knew or should have known that a corporate
communication was false or misleading but still endorsed, adopted, or
disseminated it should be liable for his breach of duty.

223. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
224. See discussion infra Part IlI.A.2.
225. Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Unisys Sav. Plan Litig.,
74 F.3d 420, 442 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotations omitted).
226. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
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3. A Fiduciary Breach Need Not Constitute Fraud or Be Committed
With Scienter as Required By a Rule 1Ob-5 Action
The standard for liability in an ERISA lawsuit is significantly lower
than the burden to show scienter required to prevail in a securities Rule
1Ob-5 action. Scienter is generally defined as a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,227 or at least severe
recklessness. 8 In contrast, a lack of intent to deceive does not insulate
a fiduciary from liability: "a fiduciary breaches its duties by materially
misleading plan participants, regardless of whether the fiduciary's
statements or omissions were made negligently or intentionally. '229 A
finding of fiduciary breach turns on whether the fiduciary knew or
should have known (through reasonable investigation) that the
communication was false or misleading when made. Thus, if defendants
were sued for the same actions under both statutes, they may not be
liable under Rule 1Ob-5 if they lacked the required intent to manipulate,
deceive or defraud, but may be liable under ERISA if a reasonably
prudent fiduciary would have acted otherwise. ERISA's duty of
prudence may be breached by mere inaction.
4. Both ERISA and the Securities Laws Impose a Duty to Correct But
ERISA's Duty to Correct Is Limited to Fiduciary Communications
The securities laws impose a duty to correct material misstatements
that at the time made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed
by subsequently discovered information actually was not. As to
statements made by third parties such as analysts, courts generally hold
that there is no duty to correct under the securities laws unless the
company has "place[d] its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the
[third party's statements]. 2 30 Under ERISA, fiduciaries must correct
mistakes in previous fiduciary communication when information later

227. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 (1976) ("damages will [not] lie under [section] 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in the absence of any
allegation of 'scienter' intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"); Alpern v. UtiliCorp United Inc.,
84 F.3d 1525, 1534 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir.
1986) ("Scienter may be established by proof of knowing or intentional practices to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.")).
228. See, e.g., Alpern, 84 F.3d at 1534 (citing Van Dyke v. Cobum Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d
1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the Eight Circuit follows the majority rule that
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement)).
229. Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999).
230. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
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reveals that the communication was false when made.
ERISA, however, does not impose affirmative disclosure
obligations to correct the misstatements of others made to the market.23'
The case law suggests that a duty to correct arises under ERISA when
and only if: (i) the person who made or disseminated the particular
statement was a fiduciary to the plan; (ii) the false or misleading
statement was sufficiently related to the plan or benefits thereunder to be
deemed fiduciary under Varity; (iii) the fiduciary discovers or should
have discovered (through prudent investigation) that the communication
was false or misleading when made; and, (iv) a reasonable plan
participant would rely on the statements in making benefits-related
decisions.232
If a material false or misleading statement is both a corporate and a
fiduciary communication, correction would be mandated by the
securities laws and by ERISA. For instance, in WorldCom, plan
participants "allege[d] that WorldCom's SEC filings contained material
misrepresentations regarding WorldCom's financial condition. 2 33 The
court held that "WorldCom had a duty ... to correct any prior material
misrepresentation when it became aware of the falsity, 234 and that such
correction would have been consistent with ERISA. 235 However, ERISA
fiduciaries would have no duty to correct corporate communications that
are not made in a fiduciary capacity, even though from a plan
participant's perspective, fiduciary statements may be indistinguishable
from non-fiduciary communications.23 6
B. Failureto Disclose Claims
The most difficult and interesting issues arise when ERISA
plaintiffs claim an entitlement to non-public company information
regarding financial and business operations that the company has not
revealed to the public at large but that the fiduciary has acquired in its
corporate capacity. The difficulty of defining the contours of an ERISA
disclosure fiduciary duty is further aggravated because the question of
duty under securities laws is muddled with complexities that may be

231. In re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 884-85 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
232. See generally supra Parts II.A.2, IIA.3.
233. See In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
234. Id. (citing In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993)).
235. See In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (citing United State v.
Sforza, 326 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2003)).
236. See id. at 757.
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resolved differently from court to court.237
Although the "duty to disclose" question under the securities laws
is not clear-cut, in theory the company either has a duty to disclose or
has the right to remain silent. Several fiduciary duty questions arise out
of the following scenarios: (i) whether the fiduciary would violate his
fiduciary duties by failing to disclose information that is required to be
disclosed under the securities laws, (ii) whether the fiduciary would
breach his duties by failing to disclose material information about the
company that does not give rise to Rule 1Ob-5 liability, and if so, (iii)
whether the fiduciary would be required to selectively disclose the
information to plan participants.
The confusion in the case law arises mainly because these three
distinct questions have generally been framed or analyzed as onewhether plan participants have a superior right to information than other
shareholders of the company. It is clear that neither the courts, the
Department of Labor, nor the SEC would allow plan fiduciaries to trade
or to cause to trade while in the possession of material, non-public
information.2 38 As the Enron239 court noted: "[l]ike any other investor,
plan participants have no lawful right, before anyone else is informed of
Enron's negative financial picture, to profit from fraudulently inflated
stock prices or to avoid financial loss by selling early before public
disclosure., 240 Selective disclosure would not "protect any lawful
financial interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries. 24 1
The two other questions are more difficult to answer and, at the
motion to dismiss level, probably a practical impossibility. Although
courts are not explicitly articulating it, analytically the initial inquiry
seems to be whether plan participants are entitled (or likely to be
entitled) to the information under the securities laws as shareholders of
the company. If the answer is "definitely yes," then the issue is whether
fiduciaries on notice of the securities violation have a heightened duty to
provide that information to plan participants even if it would force its
public disclosure. If the answer to whether the company is required to
disclose the information is "no," the question would be whether plan

237. See generally Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1640.
238. See supra Part II.B.5; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33,7881, 34,43154, 2000 S.E.C. LEXIS 1672 at *79-85 (Aug. 15, 2000) (plan
administrator cannot influence buying or selling of shares by plan while in possession of material,
nonpublic information).
239. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
240. Id. at 565.
241. Id.
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participants, even if not entitled to the information as a matter of
securities laws, are nonetheless in a relationship of trust such that
fiduciaries on notice that silence might be harmful have a duty to make
disclosures to plan participants and to the investing public to the extent
necessary to protect the assets of the plan.
Not surprisingly, courts faced with the intersections and
ambiguities of two complex bodies of federal law have reached
inconsistent results. At the motion to dismiss level, some courts have
found a duty of disclosure to the extent necessary for plan participants to
appreciate the risks of investing in company stock and make informed
decisions vis-A-vis their investments.2 42 Other courts have limited such
duty only to special circumstances where the information would have an
"extreme impact" on plan beneficiaries.243 These courts have generally
faced factual allegations against fiduciaries who were on notice that the
company was not disclosing material information (arguably or likely) in
violation of the securities laws. However, when ERISA plaintiffs have
argued that they were entitled to company information beyond the
requirements of the securities laws, courts have been reluctant to impose,
through the backdoor, a new set of disclosure obligations under the guise
of ERISA fiduciary duties. 2 "
1. An Affirmative Duty to Disclose Non-Public Information Beyond the
Requirements of ERISA and the Securities Laws Would Put ERISA
Fiduciaries in the Untenable Position of Determining What Information
to Disclose to Reconcile Their Duties Towards Shareholders and Plan
Participants
Courts have generally dismissed claims that plan fiduciaries failed
to disclose adverse non-public information of business and financial
material events affecting the value of company stock when the securities
laws would not require such disclosure.24 5 For instance, in Hull v. Policy
Management Sys. Corp.,246 the court dismissed a claim against a 401(k)
plan's administrative committee members who were sued for failing to
disclose adverse non-public information regarding the company's value

242. See Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2007).
243. See Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (quoting In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 559 (S.D. Tex. 2003)).
244. See, e.g., Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., No. CIV.A.3:00-778-17, 2001 WL 1836286, at
*9 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
245. See, e.g., id.
246. Id. at *1.
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and failing to divest the plan of company stock in light of such
information.24 7 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs sought to impose a
higher standard of care on ERISA fiduciaries with respect to plan
investment in company stock as opposed to other securities, and that this
standard of care would be illegal and unreasonable.248
In many respects, this standard would put the [c]ommittee in the
untenable position of choosing one of three unacceptable (and in some
instances illegal) courses of action; (1) obtain "inside" information and
then make stock purchase and retention decisions based on this
"inside" information; (2) make the disclosures of "inside" information
itself before acting on the discovered information, overstepping its role
and, in any case, likely causing the stock price to drop; or (3) breach249its
fiduciary duty by not obtaining and acting on "inside" information.
Similarly,

the

district

court

in

Cokenour v.

Household

International,Inc. 250 declined to grant a motion to dismiss, but noted

that defendants have no duty to "continuously gather and disclose
nonpublic information bearing some relation to the plan sponsor's
financial condition," especially when disclosures "would simply have
accelerated the demise of the Household stock held by the fund. Their
duty as fiduciaries was to prevent such losses. 25 1 This reasoning,
however, may be adequate for failure to disclose financial and business
information not required to be disclosed by the securities laws but
fiduciaries cannot have a duty to prevent losses to a plan by concealing a
securities law violation or delaying compliance with the securities laws.
2. A Heightened Disclosure Duty on ERISA Fiduciaries on
Notice of Fraudulent Concealment of Information
Would Only Force Compliance With the Securities Laws
Courts faced with allegations of nondisclosures that amount or
could amount to securities fraud have decided motions to dismiss in
favor of the ERISA plaintiffs. For instance, in Shirk v. Fifth Third
Bancorp,2 52 plan participants alleged that plan sponsors breached their
fiduciary duties, inter alia, by failing to disclose complete and accurate
247.

See id. at *3, *9.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at *9.
Id. at *9.
No. 02C7921, 2004 WL 725973 (N.D. III. Mar. 31, 2004).
Id. at *5, *8.
No.05-CV-49, 2007 WL 1100429 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2007).
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information regarding Fifth Third Stock when the company was
allegedly concealing its financial problems.2 53 The court concluded that
"[a] claim is actionable for allegedly not disclosing negative information
concerning investment in Fifth Third Stock, such that the Plan's
participants could not appreciate the true risks presented by investments
in Fifth Third Stock and therefore could not make informed decisions
regarding investments in the Plan. 254 The court further added that "a
duty to disclose exists under ERISA and that Plaintiffs have stated a
claim for a breach of that duty. 255
Even though the holding was stated in very general terms, whether
the participants were provided information about the true risks of
investing in company stock so that they could make an informed
decision,2 56 the court was faced with allegations that the company was
concealing its financial problems likely in violation of the securities
laws. 257 Holding that fiduciaries can stand still while on notice that the
company is engaging in misbehavior that could amount to securities
fraud would be akin to holding that fiduciaries have no duty to act when
on notice that plan assets are being misappropriated. The result would
not be consistent with ERISA's stated mission of establishing high
standards of fiduciary conduct.25 8
Similarly, a heightened duty of disclosure on ERISA fiduciaries
when the information would probably give rise to Rule I Ob-5 liability
would resolve Rule 1Ob-5 ambiguities on the duty to disclose question in
favor of ERISA plaintiffs. Because the fiduciary's conduct must be
judged pre-ante, imposing a duty to disclose material information that
could arguably be required disclosure under 1Ob-5 would be consistent
with ERISA's high fiduciary standards and with the disclosure goals of
the securities laws. As previously noted, there is an open question
around the circuits as to whether failure to comply with mandatory
disclosure items gives rise to Rule lOb-5 fraud-based liability and if so,
under what circumstances. 259 Imposing a duty on ERISA fiduciaries to
253. Id. at *34.
254. Id. at*14.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *4.
258. "In enacting those provisions, Congress concluded that employee benefit plans should be
administered in accordance with high standards of loyalty and prudence and that the conduct of
fiduciaries should be subject to effective oversight on behalf of plan participants and beneficiaries."
Mobile, Ala-Pensacola Fla. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Daugherty, 684 F. Supp. 270, 277
(S.D. Ala. 1988).
259. See discussion supra Part II.B.I.
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disclose such information may resolve these questions in favor of
ERISA plaintiffs who would (arguably) be entitled to the information
regardless of whether its concealment actually gives rise to fraud-based
duties.
3. Fiduciaries Have a Heightened Duty of DisclosureWhen on Notice of
a (Likely) Securities Law Violation That Threatens the Assets of the
Plan But Have No Duty to Disclose Financial and Business Information
Where the Securities Laws Would Not Require Such Disclosure
Even though a clear standard has not been articulated yet, a careful
examination of the case law suggests that when the securities laws do
not require disclosure of adverse business and financial information,
courts are generally unwilling to impose independent disclosure
requirements on ERISA fiduciaries. In contrast, courts are willing to
entertain claims that ERISA fiduciaries have a heightened duty of
disclosure when on notice that the company is engaging in corporate
fraud or is otherwise violating the securities laws. The question
underlying the legal analysis seems to be: who should bear the risk of
loss when the value of the company stock plummets, plan participants or
plan sponsors and fiduciaries? Whereas employees, like other investors,
have assumed the risk of a normal downswing of the business cycle,
they have not assumed the risk that plan sponsors or fiduciaries with
experience, expertise, and inside access, will conceal information in
violation of the securities laws.
This implicit analysis provides the appropriate standard: ERISA
fiduciaries have no duty to disclose financial and business information
beyond statutory obligations, unless on notice that the assets of the plan
are being threatened by corporate misconduct, including violations of the
securities laws. Such duty, however, is better analyzed as a subset of the
general fiduciary duty to act when on notice that plan assets are at risk of
being misappropriated, depleted, or diminished by corporate misconduct,
and not as an independent disclosure duty under ERISA's fiduciary
provisions.
CONCLUSION

This Article provided an overview of the procedural, remedial, and
substantive differences between the ERISA and the securities
misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims. Procedurally, ERISA may
allow plaintiffs to proceed with claims that would not otherwise support

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss2/10

40

Bravo: ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Liti
2009]

ERISA MISREPRESENTATION AND NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS

537

a securities class action because of the PSLRA's heightened pleading
requirements. ERISA also allows plaintiffs to proceed with discovery
even if discovery has been stayed in the companion securities case.
Thus, ERISA plaintiffs are more likely to avoid an early stage dismissal
of their case, proceed to discovery, and obtain a favorable settlement.
ERISA also affords significant substantive advantages over
traditional securities suits. First, the securities laws offer protection only
to actual purchasers or sellers, whereas ERISA may offer redress to plan
participants who were defrauded or misled into holding their securities.
As to misrepresentation claims, once the ERISA plaintiffs have
established the fiduciary nature of a communication, a showing of
ERISA fiduciary breach is less burdensome than satisfying the elements
of fraud under Rule lOb-5. More complex issues arise when ERISA
plaintiffs allege that misrepresentations in corporate communications or
SEC filings are fiduciary in nature. Such claims may be resolved under
Varity's requirement that there be a link between the false or misleading
statement and a fiduciary decision to disseminate the information in a
manner calculated to influence plan participants' benefits decisions.
Nondisclosure allegations raise more interesting intersections with
the securities laws. This Article distinguished between claims that
fiduciaries have a duty to speak when on notice that the company is
engaging in corporate fraud or is otherwise violating the securities laws,
and allegations that fiduciaries have a duty to disclose non-public
information that the company is entitled to keep silent. A careful
examination of the cases reveals an emerging standard: absent a
securities law violation, an ERISA fiduciary cannot breach his duties by
standing on the company's right to remain silent under a periodic
disclosure system. Nonetheless, to the extent that the law remains
unclear, ERISA fiduciaries cannot rely on satisfying statutory disclosure
requirements to avoid the risks of litigation.
By exploiting the legal uncertainty surrounding the question of duty
and the procedural advantages provided by ERISA, plaintiffs' lawyers
have (sometimes) exerted unwarranted settlement pressures on
defendants fearing potentially massive discovery and litigations costs.
There is a pressing need to clarify the legal standards and to effect
procedural harmonization at the pleading stage to expose groundless
claims at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money. A
failure to effect procedural harmonization may have unintended
consequences if actual or perceived risk of fiduciary liability deters
capable persons from serving as ERISA fiduciaries. The cost of these
strike suits may ultimately be borne by employees themselves if, as a
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result of greater plan expenses and higher insurance premiums, plan
sponsors curtail or stop providing their employees with retirement
benefits instead of mitigating risk by exercising more caution.
The stakes are high: the resolution of these issues implicates the
financial security of a large part of the country's aging population,2 60 the
financial and legal stability of plan sponsors and fiduciaries facing
litigation on two fronts, and the scarce judicial resources of the federal
courts confronted with the difficult task of reconciling two different lines
of duty. While no comprehensive resolution of these issues seems
imminent in the federal courts, the pressing need for clarity and
predictability invites legislative or regulatory action.26 1

260. See Fiduciary Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual Account
Plans, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,014 (proposed July 23, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (noting
that over 60 million employees have almost $2.3 trillion invested into participant-directed
retirement plans governed by ERISA) (citations omitted).
261. See, e.g., id.
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